President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has ordered the accelerated acquisition of new vessels for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), transforming the civilian agency into the nation’s primary instrument for asserting sovereignty and protecting Filipino citizens in the increasingly volatile West Philippine Sea (WPS). This directive is a direct response to a recent escalation of aggressive maritime actions by foreign state actors, signaling a strategic shift to deter coercion through enhanced, rules-based presence at sea.
The Catalyst: Water Cannons and Injured Fishermen
The urgency driving this ambitious modernization program was underscored by a severe incident on December 12, 2025, at Escoda Shoal (also known as Sabina Shoal). The Philippine Coast Guard reported that vessels from the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Chinese maritime militia (CMM) attacked Filipino fishing boats using high-pressure water cannons and engaged in dangerous blocking maneuvers within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
This aggressive confrontation resulted in physical harm, with three Filipino fishermen sustaining injuries, including bruises and open wounds. Furthermore, two Filipino fishing boats suffered significant structural damage from the high-pressure blasts. In a highly coercive tactic, small Chinese rigid hull inflatable vessels (RHIBs) also deliberately cut the anchor lines of several fishing boats.
Following the incident, Malacañang emphasized that the safety and protection of Filipino nationals in the EEZ were of paramount importance, and ordered deployment in strategic locations. The severity of the aggression drew immediate international condemnation from key allies, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and Germany, who denounced the tactics as threatening lives and livelihoods.
A Pattern of Coercion and Gray Zone Tactics
The Escoda Shoal incident is consistent with an established pattern of maritime coercion that has intensified since late 2023. Confrontations in the WPS have moved beyond simple shadowing to the deliberate use of physical force intended to disable and intimidate both government and civilian assets. This falls within a strategy known as “gray zone” deterrence, which operates below the threshold of conventional military conflict.
Attacks have routinely targeted resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded naval vessel serving as an outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal). Documented instances include:
- On December 10, 2023, the CCG employed water cannons and collisions, resulting in severe engine damage to the supply boat M/L Kalayaan and damage to the mast of the PCG vessel BRP Cabra.
- In March 2024, the supply boat Unaiza May 4 was repeatedly targeted with water cannons and collisions, shattering its windshield and causing injuries to personnel.
- A mission on June 17, 2024, saw CCG personnel escalate tactics to include boarding attempts, the brandishing of an axe, ramming, and intentionally slashing the side floaters of Philippine Navy RHIBs. Eight Filipino personnel sustained injuries, including one who lost a thumb.
By targeting civilian fishing boats, the Chinese campaign places immense pressure on the lightly armed PCG to shoulder the bulk of sovereignty assertion duties, while maximizing humanitarian distress and minimizing the risk of a military confrontation with the Philippine Navy.
The Fleet Modernization: Foreign Aid and Domestic Build-Up
The acquisition strategy outlined by President Marcos is designed to rapidly increase the PCG’s capacity for sustained offshore operations, moving away from relying on a small fleet that is stretched thin across the archipelago’s vast maritime domain. This transformative phase relies heavily on foreign Official Development Assistance (ODA) and significant domestic investment.
Key acquisitions confirmed through strategic partnerships include:
- Japanese ODA: Under the Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project (MSCIP) Phase III, the Philippines will acquire five additional 97-meter Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRVs). This deal is valued at JPY 64.38 billion (approximately P23.85 billion) and is financed through a loan. These vessels are scheduled for delivery between 2027 and 2028, joining two existing Japan-made MRRVs. Japan has also committed to providing three years of support for the operations and maintenance of these vessels.
- French ODA: A separate ODA project valued at $438 million was approved for the acquisition of 40 Fast Response Crafts (FRCs), measuring 30–35 meters. This acquisition is projected to “effectively quadruple the Philippine Coast Guard’s fleet” of ocean-going patrol vessels. Importantly, the contract stipulates that the first 20 FRCs will be built in France, with the remaining 20 constructed domestically in the Philippines.
Domestically, the Senate approved an augmentation of PHP 8.6 billion to the PCG’s 2026 budget. This funding is dedicated to procuring one additional 97-meter MRV from Japan, three 87-meter patrol vessels, and around 40 aluminum boats for search-and-rescue operations. The acquisition plan includes constructing some vessels through a joint venture with Austal in Cebu, bolstering the country’s Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP).
However, the long-term operational sustainability of this high-tech, ODA-funded fleet will require the government to allocate substantial and persistent future budgets to cover the recurring costs of fuel, spare parts, and expanded personnel.
Legal Anchor and Economic Imperative
The deployment of the enhanced PCG fleet serves as the operational extension of the Philippines’ victory in the 2016 international legal ruling. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague determined that major elements of China’s expansive claims, including the historic nine-dash line, lacked legal basis under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ruling clarified that areas like Second Thomas Shoal fall within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.
Commodore Jay Tarriela, PCG spokesperson for WPS issues, has repeatedly asserted that the presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels in these areas constitutes an illegal incursion, violating UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award. The PCG’s larger vessels are intended to provide a sustained, rules-based presence necessary to transform the paper victory of the Arbitral Award into tangible control over its maritime domain.
Protection of the WPS is also fundamentally linked to the nation’s food security. The region contributes approximately 7.19 percent to the total fisheries production in the Philippines and supports the livelihood of an estimated 600,000 Filipino fisherfolk. The vessel acquisition is thus an economic investment designed to secure access to productive fishing grounds and prevent the erosion of coastal communities’ welfare.
Deterrence, Alliances, and Diplomatic Resilience
The accelerated modernization effort is the cornerstone of the Philippine government’s strategy of collective deterrence, which involves coordinating capabilities with partners to dissuade aggressive behavior. Acquiring larger, 97-meter MRRVs offers structural resistance to water cannon attacks and ramming, raising the operational cost for the CCG to successfully disrupt missions.
The reliance on ODA from Japan and France is highly strategic, as it internationalizes Manila’s maritime security structure. Future acts of aggression against these new, internationally-backed assets become politically riskier for the foreign state involved. Furthermore, defense cooperation activities, such as the Philippines-Japan Bilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity, build critical interoperability, strengthening the collective security umbrella.
While asserting its rights, Manila continues to navigate diplomatic channels. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has conveyed tacit support for a potential Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the PCG and the CCG, particularly concerning non-controversial maritime functions like search and rescue (SAR) and environmental protection. Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro suggested that continuous dialogue through such cooperation might “just might deter” the CCG’s aggressive actions.
Ultimately, the strengthened fleet provides Manila with necessary leverage: the capacity to sustain a powerful presence ensures that dialogue is pursued from a position of relative strength. However, the operational reality of fielding a modern fleet in close proximity to a numerically superior foreign force inevitably carries the risk of accidents or miscalculation that could lead to further conflict.
